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PEIRSON l\1. HALL, Petitioner, v. SUPEIUOR COURT OF
LOS ANGEJJES COUNTY, Respondent; GERTRUDE
M. HALL, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Remittitur-New TriaL--A partial reversal of that
portion of a judgment from which an appeal was
without
remands the cause for a new trial.
[2] Id.-Remittitur-New TriaL-An
reversal remands
the cause for a new trial and places the parties in the trial
court in the same position as if the cause had never been tried,
with the exception that the opinion of the court on appenl
must be followed so far as applicable; and this principle is
equally applicable to a partial reversal of a judgment.
[3] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-AppeaL-Where the appellate
court in its opinion states that "the needs of the respective
parties do not justify the amount of alimony here allowed to
the wife," such conclusion necessarily rests on evidence then
before the court.
[4] Evidence-At Former Trial: Appeal-Reversible Error-Evidence at Former Trial.-Without the consent of the parties,
the trial court cannot determine the matter of the amount
of permanent alimony solely on the basis of the record in a
former trial, and to do so would be prejudicial error.
[5] Mandamus-To Courts.-There is no legal basis for compelling
by writ of mandate action by the trial court which should be
obtained under established procedure not followed by the
parties.
[6] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-AppeaL-After the Supreme
Court on a former appeal reversed a divorce decree insofar as
the decree awarded the wife a designated sum per month for
support and maintenance, the husband may not successfully
urge that the wife waived her procedural rights by waiting
more than five months after the remittitur was filt!rl to have
the cause set for retrial and by not moving to strike his motion
that permanent alimony be fixed by the court, where, during
that period, he had equal opportunity to have the case set
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 683; Am.Jur., Appeal
and l~rror, § 1218 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Appeal and Error, § 1760; [3, 6)
Divorce, § 217; [ 4] Evidence, ~ 273; Appeal and Error, § 1553;
[5] Mandamus,§ 36; [7] Appeal and Error,§ 1223; [8-11] Divorce,
§ 179; [12-14] Divorce, § 198; [15] Divorce, § 206; [16, 17] Divorce,
§ 211; [18-20] Divorce, § 207,
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certainty created
n1try of a f\nal divorce
Anofoot;n
that order,
decree and the
[7] Appeal-Discretion of Lower Court-·-Presumptions.-Where
the record on
does not indude a
of the proceeding·s in
on various motion,; were
an
abuse of discretion
not be
[8] Divorce-Temporary Alimony, Counsel Fees and Costs-Time
of Award.-The court is authorized to make awards for
temporary
costs and
ency of any action" for divorce
§§ 137.2, 137.3),
and an action is pending "from the time of its commencement
until its final determination upon
" (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1049.)
[9] Id.-Counsel Fees and Costs--Time of Award.--The trial
court, during the pendency of a proceeding to fix the amount
of permanent alimony to be awarded the wife, has authority
to award the wife attorneys' fees and costs necessary to enable
her to prosecute her demand for permanent alimony.
[10] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Time of Award.---An award of
temporary alimony may be made after the entry of an interlocutory di I'Orce decree.
[11] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Time of Award.-The trial court,
during the pendency of a proceeding to fix the amount of
permanent alimony to be awarded the wife, has power to allow
temporary alimony.
[12] !d.-Permanent Alimony.--In theory, alimony is considered
to be compensation to the injured spouse for the loss resulting
from the other's breach of the obligations of the marital relationship.
[13] !d.-Permanent Alimony.-The right to receive alimony depends not alone on the granting of a divorce for the fault of
the opposing party, but also on a showing that the circumtances of the parties justify the award made. ( Civ. Code,
§ 139.)
[14] !d.-Permanent Alimony.-Despite his prevalence in the
divorce action, a spouse may acquire no right to permanent
alimony in the absence of a provision for it in the decree.
[15] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Discretion of Court.-Undcr Civ.
Code, § 139, the trial judge has a broad discretion in fixing
both the amount of alimony and the manner in which it shall
be paid.
[16] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Award in Gross.-It is considered
to be the better praetice to
periodic payments of
alimony, hut the court may also require the payment of a
lump sum.
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[17] I(L-Permanent Alimony- Periodic
payments of
commence with the effective
of the divorce
but it is not an abuse of discretion
to direct payment of permanent
from defendant's appearance in the action or
its eommencement, or to reserve
to consider it at some time after
of the
decree.
[18] !d.-Permanent Alimony ~-Circumstances to be Considered.The circumstances which tL trial
may consider in fixing
permanent
include
which has
a
bearing on the
relating to the lives of both
to a consideration of the ciri'U '!stances existing at the time
of the original trial, when there is to be a retrial on such
issue, would place an artificial a;d unjustified restriction on
the exercise of its discretion.
[19] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Circums::~nces to be Considered.N ecessarily, an award of alimony looks to the future, and in
fixing the amount of permanent alimony the trial judge is not
restricted to the consideration of circumstances as of the date
of the interlocutory decree.
[20] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Circumstances to be Considered.In a proceeding to fix the amount of permanent alimony to be
awarded the wife, it is
that the court will consider
payments, previously made to the wife by stipulation and
pursuant to an award of temporary alimony pending a retrial, in framing any decree for permanent alimony and will
give such proper credit for them as may be just.

PHOCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of I.~os Angeles County to hear and determine a motion for
an order fixing the amount of permanent alimony. Writ
denied.
Irving M. Walker, James C. Sheppard and Sheppard,
Mullins, Richter & Dalthis for Petitioner.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and William E.
Lamoreaux, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
William J. Currer, Jr., for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-Peirson M. Hall appealed "from that part
of an interlocutory decree which ordered him to pay alimony
and the fees of Mrs. Hall's attornrys.'' This court ordered
that "[i]nsofar as the judgment awards Mrs. Hall $350 per
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it i;; reversed ; in an
month for
(Hall v. Hall, 42 Cal.2d 435,
other respects it is affirmed.'
436, 442 [267 P.2d 249].)
On the same day that the remittitnr was filed, upon the
ex parte application of Hall, a final judgment of divorce
was granted, incorporating by reference the provisions of
the interlocutory decree, .Mrs. Hall
unsuccessfully
to have execution on the judg·ment issued. She then moved
to vacate the judgment. ·while that motion vvas pending, she
obtained orders to show cause why Hall should not be required
to pay temporary alimony, costs and attorneys' fees "during
the pendency of this action.'' Before the time set for the
hearing upon these orders, Hall filed written opposition and
gave notice of motions for entry of final judgment and for
orders determining his existing liability, if any, and fixing
the amount of permanent alimony.
There have been no rulings made on the orders to show
cause nor upon subsequent motions by Mrs. Hall for temporary alimony and attorneys' fees. However, the final judgment has been set aside upon tht> grounds tl1at it was void
and obtained by inadvertence. Hall noticed an appeal from
the order of vacation but later abandoned it.
A minute order recites that the "Motion of defendant for
Order Determining Liability of Defendant, if any, and Fixing Amount thereof" came on for hearing and that the "Oral
motion of counsel for defendant to fix amount of permanent
alimony is argued and denied.'' Thereafter, the court denied
a motion to reconsider that ruling. It also denied a motion
later made to "reconsider its decision re: Liability of Defendant and the fixing of permanent alimony''. and denied a
"renewed motion" to fix permanent alimony.
By his present petition, Hall seeks a writ of mandate commanding the superior court "to hear and determine the motion
of your petitioner for an order fixing the amount of permanent
alimony" to be paid to Mrs. Hall and requiring it to "desist
and refrain" from hearing her application for temporary
alimony, costs and attorneys' fees. But the record shows
that the superior court has heard and dett>rmined adversely
to Hall his motion to fix permanent alimony as well as three
subsequent motions to reconsider its ruling. By his demand
for affirmative action he is endeavoring to compel the court
to hear a motion which has been ruled upon.
However, the memorandum of points and authorities and
briefs in support of the petition state that the order made
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upon his motion to determine his liability for
was erroneous. His
is that the remittitur
in Hall v.
supra, commands the trial court to fix permanent alimony and that it has no
to
any
other relief.
[1] 'l'he
and order of this court
was a partial reversal of the
of the
which the appeal was taken, without directions. In
action such a reversal remands the canse for a new trial.
(Erlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 7 Cal.2d 547, 54!)
[61 P.2d 756]; Estate of Pusey, 177 Cal. 367, 371 [170 P.
846].) [2] "[.1\.]n unqualified reversal remands the cause
for a new trial (citation), and places the parties in the trial
court in the same position as if the cause had never been
tried, with the exception tbat the opinion of the court on
appeal must be followed so far as applicable." ( Ccntml Sav.
Bank of Oakland v. Lake, 201 Cal. 438, 443 [257 P. 521] .)
'l'his principle is equally applicable to a partial reversal of a
judgment. (Cf. Pillsbnry v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.2d 469,
472 [66 P.2d 149].)
In Hall v. Hall, supra. the partial reversal of the judgment
was unqualified, and the opinion in no way restricts the
scope of a retrial of the issues set at large. 'l'he basis of
the order was the conclusion that "the needs of the respective
parties do not justify the amount of alimony here allowed
to the wife." ( 42 Cal.2d at 442.) [3] Necessarily that
conclusion rests upon the evidence then before the court.
(Cf. Erlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., sttpra, 7 Cal.2d
at 548.) lVIrs. Hall now may be able to present evidence
tending to shovv different circumstances than those shown by
the record in the former trial, and she so asserts in affidavits in
support of her motions for temporary alimony and counsel
fees.
Hall does not allege, and the record does not show, that
he has complied with the rules governing a setting for trial
in the superior court. (Rule 6, Rules for Superior Courts.)
Essentially, by this proceeding he is seeking to eompel the>
superior court to fix the amount of permanent alimony without
a retrial. [4, 5] But, without the consent of the parties. the
trial court could not determine that matter solely on the
basis of the record in the former trial. ( Blache ;_ Blache,
37 Cal.2d 531, 53G [233 P.2d 547].) To do so would br
prejudicial error ( lleinfelt Y. Arth, 4· Cal.App.2d 381. 384
[41 P.2d 1U1]), and there is no legal basis for compelling
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writ of
should
be obtained under established
the
for
the matter for trial may cause
there is available to him a method
the date of a trial.
Rules for Superior
Courts.)
[6] The further contention is made that Mrs. Hall waived
her procedural
wa
more than five months after
the remittitur was filed to have the cause
for retrial and
by not moving to strike Hall's motion that permanent alimony
be fixed by the court.
!bat
however, Hall
had equal opportunity to have the ease set for retrial, and
the trial judge was
m
that Mrs. Hall's
failure to do so rc'Snlted from the uncertainty created by
her husband's entry of a final judgment of divorce and the
necessity of contesting that order. No authority is cited
for the proposition that Urs. Hall waived her right to object
to Hall's motion by proceeding to argue it at the time set
for a hearing upon it instrad of interposing a motion to strike.
In any event, all of these objections, at most, would be grounds
for showing all abuse of discretion
the trial judge in
failing to dispense with the procedure required for setting
the case for trial. [7] 'l'he record do<'s not include a transcript of the
in which rulings upon the various
motions were made. and an a bnse of discretion may not be
presumed.
v. State Board
Equalization, 42 Cal.2d
376, 387 [2G7 P.2d
.)
[8] Hall's petition for mandate also is directed toward
prohibiting a hearing upon ::\Irs. Hall's motions for temporary
alimony, costs and attor;1eys' fees. 'J'he court is authorized
to make those awards'' [d]uring the pendency of any action"
for divorce. ( Civ.
§ 0 137 .2, 137 .3.) Section 1049 of
the Corle of Civil Procrdnr0 states that an action is pending
"from the time of its eommencement until its final determination upon appeal."
Sections 137.2 and 137.3 are a reRtatement of former section
137 of the Civil Code. LentcT v.
CmtTt, 38 Cal.2d
676 [242 P .2cl :321], considerecl the authority of the superior
court to a~ward counsel ft'"S and C03ts in connection \Vith the
applieatlon of the wife for a writ of prohibition pending
au appeal from au order of modifieation of the terms of a
fiual decree of di voree
to the enstody of the children.
It was pointpr} cmt that "nnder ~retion 137 . . the phrase
therein, 'when an aeiion for eli vorce is pemling,' embraced
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many diverse
divorce action
and arising after
decree." (P. 685.)
After
several decisions
awards of counsel
fees and costs made
the
of proceedings to
enforce or modify awards of
alimony or to construe the provisions of a property settlement agreement, the
court concluded that attorneys· fees and costs properly were
allowed. "On
" it was
"there is no difference
between actions in which a woman is compelled by her former
husband to resist by an appeal a proceeding brought by him
to modify a custody or
award and actions in which
she is compelled to seek prohibition to prevent improper
modification of such awards." (Pp. 685-686.) [9] The
Lerner case and authorities cited support the contention that
the trial court in the
action has authority to award
to J\Irs. Hall the attorneys' fees and costs necessary to enable
her to prosecute her demand for permanent alimony. (Accord: Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36, 44 [265 P.2d 873];
Wilson v. Wilson, 33 Cal.2d 107, 1J5 [199 P.2d 671].)
[10] Similarly, awards of temporary alimony made after
the entry of an interlocutory deeree have been upheld. (N elson v. Nelson, 7 Cal.2d 449, 45a !GO P.2d 982] [during the
appeal by the hnsband from an order granting the wife's
motion to vacate the final decrPe J ; Ucrnard v. Bernard, 79
Cal.App.2d 353, 358 [179 P.2d
[pending a hearing upon
the wife's application for permanent alimony made after the
interlocutory decree but before a final decree] ; DeLeshe v.
DeLeshe, 80 Cal.App.2d 517, 518 l181 P.2d 931] [pending
appeal from an order modifying the interlocutory decree];
cases cited in Kellett v. Kellett, 2 Cal.2d 45, 49 [39 P.2d 203]
[pending appeal from the interlocutory decree].) [11] By
the same principles, here, during the pendency of the proceeding to fix the amount of permanent alimony to be awarded
to Mrs. Hall, the trial court has power to allow temporary
alimony.
Neither Wilson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.2d 458 [189 P.2d
266], nor Harrold v. Harrold, 43 Cal.2d 77 [271 P.2d 489],
states a contrary rule. The vVilson case considered the effect
of a failure to incorporate expressly in the final decree the
provisions of the interlocmtory judgment relating to permanent alimony. The rt~lc applied in the controversy between
the Harrolds was that a final decree might be entered under
the circumstances there presented despite the pendency of
litigation as to the rights of the parties to the community
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court did not decide whether such action
would be proper if an issue relating to permanent alimony
i>; pending, or, if such a judgment could be entered, what
its effect might be upon the right to receive either temporary
or permanent
An additional
is raised by Hall as to the circumstauces which may be considered in
the amount of
permanent
and the time when such an a·ward should
become operative. It is his position that the portions of the
interlocutory decree from which no appeal was taken are
now final and fix the right of Mrs. Hall to support as of the
time specified thrrein for the commencement of his payments
therefor. Upon a retrial to determine the amount of such
payments, he maintains, the trial judge will be limited to a
consideration of the circumstances existing at the date of
the original trial. Mrs. Hall asserts that all of the circumstances, ineluding those arising between the trial and a retrial,
properly may be considered.
[12] In theory, alimony is considered to be compensation
to the injured spouse for the loss resulting from the other's
breach of the obligations of the marital relationship. (Arnold
v. Arnold, 76 Cai.App.2d 877, 885-886 [174 P.2d 674].)
[13] But the right to receive it depends not alone upon the
granting of a divorce for the fault of the opposing party,
but also upon a showing that the circumstances of the parties
justify the award made. ( Civ. Code, § 139; Bowman v.
Bowman, 29 Cal.2d 808, 811 [178 P.2d 751, 170 A.. L.R. 246] .)
[14] Despite his prevalence in the divorce action, a spouse
may acquire no right to permanent alimony in the absence
of a provision for it in the decree. (Puckett v. Puckett, 21
Cal.2d 8:33, 841 [136 P.2d 1]; Howell v. HoweU, 104 Cal. 45,
47 [37 P. 770, ,13 Am.St.Rep. 70].)
In Hall v. Hall, supra, the portion of the interlocutory
judgment dealing with permanent alimony provided that
''the defendant pay to the plaintiff for her support and
maintenance the sum of Three Hundred Fifty ($350.00) per
month on or before the 6th day of each calendar month,
commencing July 6, 1952; and until the further order of
the Court. . . . '' Implicit in the judgment is the determination that the circumstances justified the award made but not
that Mrs. Hall was entitled to some other, undisclosed, amount
in the event of a retrial upon that issue. Hall's appeal from
"that part of the judgment . . . rendered in favor of plaintiff Gertrude M. Hall, awarding said plaintiff 'rhree Hundred
Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month for her support and
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circumstances
not decide nor inf{>r that

other circumstances which
be found for
no amount for support and maintenance.
[15] Under section 139 of the Civil
the trial judge
has a broad discretion in
both the amount of alimony
and the manner in which it shall be paid. [16] It is considered to be the better
to
periodic payments
(see Tremper v.
39 Cal.App. 62. 65 [177 P. 868] ),
but the court may also require the payment of a lump sum.
(Honey v. Honey, 60 Cal.App.
762 [2]4 P. 250].) The
only limitations placed
the section upon the time in which
the order for support shall be
are that the allowance must be made to a spouse "for his or her life; or for
such shorter period a" th0 court rnay deem
''; also that
the allowance terminates "upoll tlw death of the obligor or
upon the remarriage of the other party." [17] Generally,
periodic payments commence with the effective date of the
decree; but it is not an abuse of discretion to direct payment
of permanent alimony "from the appearance of the defendant
in the action, or from its commencement"
v. Sharon,
75 Cal. 1, 46 [16 P. 345]), or to reserve jurisniction to consider it at some time after entry of the judgment of divorce.
(See McCaleb v. McCaleb, 177 CaL 147, 149 [169 P. 1023] .)
[18] The circumstances which the trial judge may consider
in fixing permanent alimony include ''practically everything
which has a
bearing upon the present and prospective matters relating to the lives of both parties." (Hall v.
Hall, supra, 42 Cal.2d 442.) 'ro limit the court to a consideration of the circumstances existing at the time of the original
trial would place an artificial and wholly unjustified restriction upon the exercise of his discretion. [19] Necessarily,
an award of alimony looks to the future. Unquestionably, if
the trial judge Wt're to fix alimony as of the date of the
interlocutory decree without considering the presently existing circumstances he ;yould b~" r'n i itled to consider them in
connection with a possible modifieation of the award. To
45 C.2d-l3
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restrict him in the manner suggested by Hall could result
m
modification proceeding.
[20] Finally, some concern is expressed that payments
previously made to Mrs Hall by stipulation and pursuant to
an award of temporary alimony pending a retrial may overlap
those required under an award of permanent alimony. It is
to be presumed that the court will consider such payments
in framing any decree for permanent alimony and give such
proper credit for them as may be just.
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ
denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the
conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandate
here. I do not agree, however, with the holding therein that
the trial court, in fixing the amount of permanent alimony,
should not be limited to a consideration of the circumstances
existing at the time the interlocutory decree of divorce was
granted.
Section 139 of the Civil Code provides that the trial court
may make such suitable allowance to the wife as the court
may ''deem just, having regard to the circumstances of the
parties respectively; and the court may from time to time
modify its orders in these respects . . . . " In Hall v. Hall,
42 Cal.2d 435 [267 P.2d 249], we reversed the judgment of
the trial court insofar as it awarded Mrs. Hall $350 per
month for her support and maintenance. Such a reversal
set the matter of permanent alimony at large and remanded
that part of the cause for a new trial. On the retrial of
the amount of alimony to be awarded, I see no escape from
the conclusion that the trial court is limited to a consideration
of the circumstances of the parties as they existed at the time
the original award was made. We held that the amount
awarded to Mrs. Hall at that time constituted an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court under the facts then
prevailing. The code provides that the court may, from time
to time, modify its orders with respect to the support provisions made by it. The modification must, however, be made
upon a proper showing (Bradley v. Bradley, 40 Cal.App.
638 [181 P. 237]) that conditions have changed since the
entry of the initial order (Grant v. Grant, 52 CaLApp.2d 359
[126 P.2d 130]; Triest v. Triest, 67 Cal.App.2d 320 [154
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P.2d 2]) ; and
such facts as have arisen or have become
known to the party since the entry of the decree may be the
basis of modification (Bradley v. Bradley, 40 CaL\ pp. 638
; Ralphs v.
86 CaLApp.2d 324 [194
[181 P.
P.2d
At the time the interlocutory decree was granted and the
allowance for permanent support made to Mrs. Hall, the circumstances then prevailing led us to conclude that the award
was excessive and constituted an abuse of discretion. Since
that time, Judge Hall, as a federal district judge, has received
an increase in salary. Had there been no reversal by this
court, Mrs. Hall, upon proper application for modification,
might have been able to show that because of changed circumstances she was entitled to a modification of the prior order
for alimony as to future installments. The earlier order
would, however, have been final as to accrued installments
(Zaragoza v. Zaragoza, 48 Cal.App.2d 27 [119 P.2d 162] ;
Stevens v. Stevens, 88 Cal.App.2d 654 [199 P.2d 314] ; Steele
v. Steele, 108 Cal.App.2d 595 [239 P.2d 63]). It seems most
obvious here that on the retrial of the matter of support,
the trial court must be limited to a consideration of the
circumstances as they originally existed and that any modification must be made upon a proper showing of changed
circumstances and date from the time of stwh changed circumstances. This is not to say that a new action must be
brought because to avoid multiplicity of suits, a court, sitting
in equity, may consider all related matters brought to its
attention. It should be clearly understood, however, that
any increase in salary received by Judge Hall since the time
of the interlocutory decree should not be considered by the
trial court in its retrial of the matter of permanent alimony
as originally awarded. If this increase in salary should
prompt the trial court to feel that an increase in support
allowance should be made to Mrs. Hall, such increase should
not be retroactive to the time the original award was made
because of the circumstances then prevailing. In other words,
it is my view that an award of permanent alimony must be
based upon the circumstances of the parties existing at the
date of the interlocutory decree, and any modification of such
award may not take effect until the date a change in such
circumstances is shown to exist. The trial court may, of
course, retry the issue of permanent alimony and hear any
application for modification at the same time.
Schauer, J., concurred.

